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An election procedure based on voter preference rankings is said to be monotonic if the alterna- 
tive chosen by the procedure for any profile of voter preference rankings is also chosen after it is 
moved up in one or more of the profile’s rankings. Several reasonable-sounding election pro- 
cedures that are known to violate monotonicity are examined along with some new classes of non- 
monotonic procedures. Closely-related procedures that are monotonic are also identified. The 
procedural mechanisms and combinatorial structures that give rise to failures of monotonicity are 
analyzed in some detail. 
1. Introduction 
Social choice theory [2,3,4,5,7,14] has long been concerned with procedures that 
are designed to select a collectively best alternative or subset of alternatives from an 
available set on the basis of individual preference rankings of the alternatives. In 
this paper I shall examine a condition that has been proposed as an obviously com- 
pelling property that such procedures should satisfy, and demonstrate that it is 
violated by a number of apparently reasonable selection procedures, some of which 
are widely used in practice. These include certain runoff election methods and 
sequential majority elimination voting as well as a procedure that does not involve 
successive eliminations. It will be assumed throughout that the basic alternative set 
X is finite with at least three elements. 
I shall refer to the condition in question as monotonicity, although closely related 
conditions are also known as nonnegative responsiveness and as positive association 
of social and individual values [ 1,2]. The version used here says that if x is the 
unique collectively best alternative for a given profile n of individual preference 
rankings, and if profile rr’ is obtained from n by moving x up in some of the 
rankings, leaving all else unchanged, then x should be one of the collectively best 
alternatives for profile TZ’. 
Monotonicity is clearly a desirable condition for social selection procedures, and I 
am not aware that it has been seriously challenged in the literature. Although 
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violations of conditions related to monotonicity were recognized many years ago,’ 
its formal introduction into the social choice literature (in a social ranking version) 
appears to be due to Arrow [I]. Later, Smith [15] observed that monotonicity fails 
for a class of social ranking procedures. Others [6,9,13] have noted violations of 
monotonicity that are similar to those discussed by Smith, with the exception of one 
procedure associated with the name of Dodgson (Lewis Carroll), 
Later sections of the paper will examine the known monotonicity violators along 
with other classes of reasonable-sounding election procedures that also violate 
monotonicity. Since it is usually far from obvious that monotonicity fails for these 
procedures, and since various special cases and closely-related procedures do in fact 
satisfy monotonicity, I have used the phrase “monotonicity paradoxes” to describe 
the potentially unexpected failure of monotonicity. Once one sees why monotonicity 
can fail for various procedures, it may also come as a surprise to note that certain 
other procedures are monotonic. For example, a limiting case (denoted f2) of a class 
of nonmonotonic procedures discussed in Section 4 turns out to be monotonic, and 
some generic procedures that are nonmonotonic for four or more alternatives are in 
fact monotonic when X has only three members. 
A major aim of the paper is to get behind the bare statement of monotonicity and 
to understand the mechanisms of the procedures and their combinatorial structures 
that produce the counterexamples to monotonicity. For the most part, these 
structures are illustrated through the proofs of the theorems, which are therefore an 
integral part of the exposition. Two special binary relations for preference profiles 
are central to much of the analysis, namely a strong positional dominance relation 
and the strict simple majority relation, We discuss these further in the next section, 
which presents the formal background for our ensuing examination of specific 
election procedures. 
2. Election procedures 
A strict ranking of the set X of m 2 3 alternatives will be written as xy ..a z when x 
is ranked first, y second, and z last. Alternative x is ranked ahead of y in a ranking if 
x precedes y in the ranking. Moreover, x moves up in going from ranking r to r’ if all 
alternatives in X \ {x> have the same order in r and r’, and x is ranked ahead of more 
alternatives in r’ than in r. 
Let 17 be the set of all nonempty finite lists or profiles of (strict) rankings on X. 
Each term (individual ranking) in a profile II ~17 is viewed as a judge’s or voter’s 
ranking of the alternatives from best to worst. We shall often describe a profile by 
the number of voters who have each ranking on X. Thus, n = (xyz,xyz,zyx) will be 
’ See, for example [12,p. 211 and [I 1,~. 931. These passages were brought to my attention by Steven 
Brams, who was informed of them by Duff Spafford. I am indebted to Brams also for [6]. 




This suggests that the election procedures considered below are anonymous (do not 
depend on the order in which the terms of rc are listed), which is indeed true. 
Let F be the set of all functions that map I7 into the nonempty subsets of X. Each 
f EF is an election procedure, and each f(n) is an elected set. Although many 
contexts require the selection of a single alternative, it is useful to allow the elected 
set to contain more than one alternative. We view f(n) as the collectively best 
(socially most preferred) alternatives in X as determined by f acting on II. 
Accordingly, one might propose that every reasonable election procedure should 
satisfy 
Monotonicity. Zf f(n) = {x}, and if TC’ is obtained from 7~ by moving x up in one or 
more terms of rt, then XE f(n’). 
Many election procedures are obviously monotonic, and others can be shown to 
be monotonic with a little effort. For example, if 1x1 = 3 and 1,,12 and 0 points are 
assigned, respectively, to each voter’s first, second, and third-ranked alternatives, 
and if f(n) consists of the alternatives with the largest point total, then f is 
monotonic so long as 1 LA~zO. Other monotonic examples are provided by many 
Condorcet social choice functions [9], although some of these are not monotonic, as 
will be noted below. 
Before proceeding to our theorems and examples concerning nonmonotonic 
election procedures, we define some of the key notions used in the analysis. Two 
binary relations for each rr E Z7 will be used several places. The first is M(z), defined 
by: xM(rr)y if more terms of rc have x ranked ahead of y than have y ranked ahead 
of x. This is Condorcet’s strict majority relation, and we shall say that f E F is 
Condorcet if f(x) = {x} whenever xM(n)y for all y E X \ {x}. Frequent use will be 
made of profiles for which M(n) is nontransitive and in fact cyclic, as when 
xM(n)yM(7r)zM(7r)x for 7r= (xyz, zxy, yzx). 
We shall also use “majority” counts and define fi(x, y) as the number of terms of 
n in which x is ranked ahead of y#x. The corresponding “majority” proportion is 
n(x, y), defined by 
m, Y) = fw, Y) fw Y) + ff(Y, x) ’ 
so that n(x, y) + n( y, x) = 1 for distinct x and y. 
The second relation alluded to above is an asymmetric and transitive strong 
positional dominance relation D(n) that is based on position counts. Let x(x;) be the 
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number of terms of rc that rank x in position i, for i = 1, . . . ,m when 1x1 =m. 
Clearly, n(x,) + ... + n(x,) = n( y,) + a+’ + n(y,) for any x, y E X. The relation D(n) is 
defined by 
xD(7r)y iff f n(x,)> i n(y,) fork=1 ,..., m-l, 
,=I ,=I 
when 1x1 =m. 
Relation D(n) will be used in connection with positional scoring. We shall let ,4,,, 
be the set of all nonincreasing (A1zA2z .a. z A,) and nonconstant (A, >A,) 
m-dimensional real vectors A = (A i, . . . ,A,,,), and refer to A E A, as a score vector. 
The following lemma connects D and A. 
Lemma 1. If 1x1 =m, IEA,andxD(rc)y, then Cyl, Ain(xi)>Czl A,lr(y,). 
Proof. Summation by parts gives 
,t, A[n(x;> - dY;)l= y;: [ ,$, (WI) - n(Y;+-&+ I), 
and the lemma’s hypotheses imply that the right hand side is positive. q 
We shall consider two main types of elimination election procedures in the next 
three sections. One of these first orders the alternatives to give a voting order o(n). 
It then determines a winner by sequential majority comparisons according to a(n), 
with one alternative eliminated on each comparison. Sequential majority elimina- 
tion is discussed in Section 5. 
The other type also eliminates one (or more) alternatives in each stage but does 
this solely on the basis of the alternatives that remain at that stage. For a given rc E 17 
for X, let nA for nonempty A C X be the profile obtained from rc by deleting all 
alternatives not in A. In addition, let Hk for k = 3, . . . , m with JXJ = m be the set of 
all real valued functions defined on the Cartesian product of a generic k-element 
subset of X and the set of all profiles on that subset. We then define a general class 
Fe of elimination election procedures as follows. 
Definition. Given X with m elements, _f~ F, if and only if there are hkEHk for 
k=3,..., m such that f(n) is determined as follows for every rc~Z7. Begin with 
A =X. Compute hk(a, ?r~) for all a E A when IA ) = k, and let A * be the set of all 
a E A that do not have the smallest value of hk(a, zA) over A. Then: 
if JA */ =0, take f(n) =A; 
if (A*1 = 1, take f(n)=A*; 
if IA*1 =2 withA*={a,b}, take f(n>={a} if uM(n)b, f(n)=(b) if bM(rr)a, and 
f(n) = {a, b) otherwise; 
if JA */ 2 3, repeat the process with the new A equal to the current A*. 
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According to the definition, the lowest-scoring alternatives in a given stage are 
eliminated on the basis of the appropriate hk applied to the reduced profile for that 
stage unless all alternatives have the same lowest score (IA *I = 0). If we reach a stage 
with two alternatives, the elected set is determined by the simple majority relation 
on those two alternatives. 
The next section considers procedures in Fe whose h’s are based on score vectors. 
We shall be primarily concerned with the class F&l,) of procedures for X= {x, nz>, 
where f E F,(A3) if and only if f E F, and there is a I E _4 s such that, for all a E X and 
7rEz7, 
h&Z, 7r) = i RQc(C7i). 
i=l 
Section 4 then examines procedures in F, whose h’s are based on majority propor- 
tions. When (X( = 3, we shall use the set G of all symmetric [g(o, p) =g(p, a)] and 
continuous real valued functions g on [0, l] x [0, l] that increase in both arguments 
and have g(O,O) =0 and g(1, 1) = 1. We then define F,(G) for X= {x, _Y,z} by 
f EF,(G) if and only if f E F, and there is a g E G such that, for all a E X and z ED, 
h3@, @ = g(W, b), n@, c)) 
when {a, b, c> = {x, y, z} .As 71 changes in such a way that a’s standing relative to b 
and c improves, hj(a, 7~) increases. Procedures in F,(G) first eliminate the alternative 
with the worst joint showing against the other two according to a particular g 
function. 
3. Score vector elimination 
This section considers successive limination when score vectors are used to effect 
eliminations by lowest scores with 
h/& ?r,‘i) = ; $%c,&) 
i=l 
when 14 I= k and L(@E/~~. The main result is essentially due to Smith [15]. 
Our basic conclusion is that all f E F, for m z 3 that are based on elimination by 
score vectors as described above are nonmonotonic. Since cases with m>3 are 
analyzed in a manner that is very similar to the m =3 analysis, I shall focus on 
F&13) for the three-alternative case. 
We begin with a general result that does not depend explicitly on selection by 
elimination, but which will be used shortly in connection with F&43). 
Theorem 1. Suppose X= {x, y, z) and f E F satisfies the following condition for ali 
7Tel7: 
[{a, b, c} = {x, Y,Z}, 4D(n>c, bD(n)c, uM(7r)bl *f(n) = {a}. 
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Then f is not monotonic. 
Remark. The condition in Theorem 1 illustrates the sense of “paradox” intended in 
this paper. The condition says that if one alternative is positionally inferior to the 
other two in that it is strongly dominated by each, then the elected set shall be 
determined (in part) by simple majority between the dominating alternatives. On the 
face of it, this condition does not seem unreasonable. However, it is incompatible 
with monotonicity. 
Proof of Theorem 1. Let II and rc’ be the following 27-voter profiles in which n’ is 
obtained from rr by moving x ahead of y in three of the four yxz rankings and in the 
two zyx rankings: 
7t n’ 71 71) 
xyz 6 9 yxz 4 1 
zxy 6 8 zyx 2 0 
yix 6 6 xzy 3 3 . 
It is easily checked that M(rr’)=M(rr) and that strict majorities cycle, with 
xMyMzMx. Moreover, {xD(n)z, yD(rr)z} and {xD(rc’)y,ti(rr’)y}. The condition of 
the theorem then gives f(n)= {x} and f(7c’) = {z), and therefore f is not 
monotonic. 0 
As x moves ahead of y in several rankings of 71 to yield rc’ in the preceding proof, 
y is moved down enough so that dominance between y and z is reversed, from 
yD(rc)z to zD(rc’)y. Because of the x-dominances and the majorities, this switch 
changes the winner from x to z. The third alternative, y, which has the most first- 
place votes in rc and would therefore win under simple plurality voting, plays the 
role of x’s spoiler: by doing x the favor of “transferring” some of its votes to x by 
the noted inversions, y causes x to lose the election. 
Corollary 1. Every f E F,(A3) is nonmonotonic. 
Proof. Lemma 1 and the definition of F,(A3) imply that the condition in Theorem 1 
holds for every fe F&13). 0 
The elimination procedures in F&43) are often modified by having no runoff 
between the two alternatives with the largest h3 values when some alternative gets 
more than a specified percent of first-place votes. For example, the single 
transferable vote method [6] for m = 3 determines a winner without elimination if 
some alternative gets more than 50 percent of the first-place votes. Otherwise, the 
alternative with the fewest first-place votes is eliminated (i.e., A =(l,O,O)), and the 
winner is determined by majority between the other two. Every such procedure also 
violates monotonicity so long as the critical percent exceeds 100/3. 
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Corollary 2. Given X= {x, y, z] and 6 > 0, let F,(6) be the set of alf f E F&l,), 
modified so that ly one of the three alternatives has more first-place votes than the 
others and is rankedfirst in more than lOO(6 + f) percent of the terms of n, then it is 
the unique alternative in f(n). Every f E F,(6) is nonmonotonic. 
Proof. We generalize the profiles in the proof of Theorem 1 as follows: 
n n’ 
XYZ N N+3 
WY N N+2 
yw N N 
yxz n+2 n-l 
zyx n n-2 
xzy n+l n+l . 
As before, three yxz rankings are changed to xyz, and two zyx rankings are changed 
to WY in going from z to rc’. So long as n L 2 and N> n + 3, majorities cycle, with 
x~y~z~x, and (xD(rr)z, YD(lr)z) and (xD(n’)y,z_D(n’)yJ. The maximum number 
of first-place votes for an alternative in either n or n’ is N+ n + 4 for x in n’. Given 
any 6 > 0, choose n and N so that n 2 2, N> n + 3 and (N+ n + 4)/(3N+ 3n + 3) < 
6-t f. Given f E&(6), it then follows from Lemma 1 and the majorities that 
f(n)= (x> and f@‘)=(z). Cl 
One can in fact go further than Corollary 1 to generate a sequence of mono- 
tonicity violations as follows. Consider the three profiles (N= 11, n = 7) 
71 n’ En 
xyz 11 14 14 
WY 11 13 19 
yw 11 11 17 
YXZ 9 6 0 
zyx 7 5 5 
XZY 8 8 2 
in which n and rr’ are as in the preceding proof, and 71” is obtained from it’ by 
moving z ahead of x in the six yxz rankings and in six of the eight xzy rankings. 
Then, for any f EF,(A& or for any f that satisfies the condition of Theorem 1, 
f(n)=(x), fW)=Izl, andfW’)=(y}. 
More generally, if K is any positive integer, and if f for X= (x, y,z) satisfies the 
condition of Theorem 1, then there are profiles rrl, rr2, .. . , nK+ ,, each of which 
beyond the first is obtained from its predecessor by moving its predecessor’s elected 
alternative up in several rankings, such that every f(nk) is a singleton and 
f(nk+l)?tf(nk) for k= 1 , . . . , K. I leave the proof to the reader. 
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4. Majority proportion elimination 
We now consider election procedures in the class F,(G) for X= {x, y, z} defined at 
the end of section 2, along with two other procedures for X= {x, y,z} that are based 
on elimination by majority proportions but are not in F,(G) because they have no 
corresponding g functions that strictly increase in both arguments. The latter two 
procedures will be denoted f, and fi and are based, respectively, on h&z, n) = 
min{ n(a, b), ~(a, c)> and h&z, 71) = max{ n(a, b), ~(a, c)} when {a, b, c} = {x, y, z}. 
Procedure fi first eliminates the alternative that is beaten the worst by some other 
alternative, and f2 first eliminates the alternative whose best showing against the 
others is worst. 
It turns out that fi is the only monotonic election procedure in F,(G) U (fi, fi}. 
After proving monotonicity for fi later in the section, we shall note that its natural 
extension to 1x12 4 is not monotonic. In the meantime, our attention will focus on 
F,(G). 
We note first that every f~ F,(G) is a Condorcet election procedure. To see this, 
let a = n(x, _Y), /3 = n(x, z) and y = ~(3, z) so that the h, values for the relevant g E G 
are 
h3c.G n) = da; PI, 
h3cx n) =g(l -a, Y), 
h,(z, n> =g(l -P, 1 - Y). 
Suppose min{a; p} > +, so that xM(7c)y and xM(z)z. Then 
g(a,L0>mink(l -a,Y),g(l -P,l -r)), 
which implies that f(n) = {x} for the f~ F,(G) that is based on g. 
The additive g function, defined by 
s(a; P) = 3(a +P), 
corresponds to the f~ F,(G) that has been referred to as Nanson’s function [3,9]. It 
is equivalent to the Borda-elimination procedure in Fe(A3) that uses A = (2,LO). As 
noted in [lo], the latter procedure is the only one in F&13) - up to a positive affine 
transformation on the components of I - that is a Condorcet procedure. Therefore 
F&13) and F,(G) have exactly one procedure in common. 
Despite the fact that these two classes of election procedures are almost disjoint, it 
might be true that procedures in F,(G) satisfy the condition in Theorem 1. However, 
this is not the case, as we show with the following 37-voter profile: 
77 71 
xyz 12 yxz 2 
zxy 10 xzy 3 . 
Yzu 10 
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Clearly, xM(7z)yA4(~)zM(rr)x, and, since (x1,x2,x3) = (15,12, lo), (yt, yz, yj) = 
(12,12,13) and (zr,z2,z3) =(lO, 13,14), we havexD(rc)z and yD(rr)z. Hencef(n) = {x} 
for every f that satisfies the condition in Theorem 1. Suppose, however, that g E G is 
such that g(20/37,13/37)>g(24/37,12/37). Then, since 
(n(u,z),n(~,x))=(24/37,12/37), (~(z,x),Tc(z,Y))= (20/37,13/37), 
the corresponding f E F,(G) will eliminate y in the first stage (x always stays in) and 
give f(n) = {z}. 




7-c’ x ahead y in N yxz 
G context, 
h3k 71) =g(W+ VP, W+ 3)/d, 
and therefore f E F,(G) will eliminate z in the first stage and give f(n) = {x} 
since xM(n)y. Since 
h,(x, n’) =g(GN+ 5)~ W+ 3)p), 
+I= g(W+ 4)~ 
F,(G) will eliminate either y or z (possibly both) in first stage. as 
N-+oo, h3(y, n’)-‘g(+,O) h,(z, n’)-‘g(S,f). Since g(&i)>g(&O), it follows from 
continuity for that h3(y, rc’)< h3(z, sufficiently large N. Hence every 
fo F,(G) will have some N at which y is eliminated in first stage, thus 
giving f(n’) = {z>. 
now return to f, f2 defined at outset of this section. It is easily seen 
that both Condorcet procedures, a slight modification in profiles used 
the proof of Theorem 2 shows that not monotonic. Thus, following 
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theorem verifies that fi is the only elimination procedure considered thus far for 
X= {x, y, z} that is monotonic. 
Theorem 3. fi is monotonic. 
Proof. Let rc and n’ be any two profiles for which rr’ is obtained from 7-c by moving 
x up in some rankings. We assume that f&z) = {x}, and show that x~f~(n’). Let 
a = maxi 71(x, Y), 77(x, z)}, 
P=max(rr(y,x), nC~,z>}, 
Y = maxi n(z, -9, n(z, u>>, 
and let a’, p’ and y’ be defined similarly for TC‘. Clearly, a’? a, /3’s /? and y’s y. In 
addition, let A4* represent majority win or tie, so that aM*(n)b iff either aM(z)b or 
n(a, b) = ?r(b, a). 
Suppose first that xM*(n)yM*(~~)ZM*(rr)x. Then p = n(,v, z) = n’(y, z) = /3’, 
a = n(x, _Y) and y = n(z,x). Given f*(n) = {x], we require a>min(p, y}. Moreover, 
/?z y, for otherwise z of*, and f2(rr) = {x} further requires a> /3. Hence 
a’> j?‘= /3z y y’, and therefore fz(z’) = {x}. A similar proof shows that mono- 
tonicity holds if xM*(n)ti*(z)yM*(~~)x. 
Suppose then that there is no M*(X) cycle and, for definiteness, assume that 
yM*(lr)z, so that either yM(n)x or xM(z)z. If both _vM(n)x and xM(rc)z, then z is 
eliminated in the first round and fi(n)= {y}, contrary to f2(n)= {x}. If yM(rc)x, 
and zM*(rr)x, then x will be eliminated in the first round, contrary to &(n)= {x}. 
Therefore, xM*(rr)y and xM(rc)z, so a>+zy and Pr32y. Then either /3=+=~, 
hence f2(z) = {x}, or /3> y, in which case f*(n) = {x} requires xM(rc)y. Since /?‘= p, 
either case will give f2(n’) = (x}. 0 
The natural extension of fi for larger sets eliminates the alternatives with the 
smallest value of max{rc(a, b):b EA \ (a}} when A is the remainder at any stage, 
unless all remaining alternatives have the smallest max value. The failure of this 
extension to be either Condorcet or monotonic is illustrated with the following four- 
alternative profiles: 
n n’ 
wxyz 8 8 
yww 6 6 
vcyw 4 4 
wzxy 3 0 (move x ahead of z for 7t’) 
wxzy 0 3 , 
Here w has an 11-to-10 majority over each of the other three alternatives, but 
f2(n) = {x> for the extended f2: the max ti values for (x, y,z, w) are (15,14,13,1 I), so 
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w is eliminated first; the max ii values for (x, y,z) in the reduced profile are 
(15,14,13) so z is eliminated next, and xM(rc)y. Hence the extended f- is not 
Condorcet. The initial max ii’ values are the same as the max ii values, except that 
the value for z drops from 13 to 10. Therefore z is eliminated first under 7~‘. The max 
72’ values for (x, y, W) in the reduced profile are (15,10,11) so that y is eliminated 
next. Finally, f2(n’) = {w} since wM(rr’)x. Therefore the extended fi is not 
monotonic. 
5. Sequential majority elimination 
A sequential majority elimination procedure for 1x1 =m first specifies an order 
of voting a(n) for profile TI and then makes a series of m - 1 pairwise majority 
comparisons between alternatives according to a(n). The initial comparison is 
between the first two alternatives in o(n), and the kth comparison for k> 1 is 
between the k + 1 st alternative in a(n) and the winner of the preceding comparison. 
The alternative that wins the final comparison is elected. 
The winner of each comparison is decided by simple majority unless there is a tie. 
Ties can be broken in several ways [e.g. in favor of the alternative that comes earlier 
in a(z), or in favor of the alternative that comes later in o(z)], or the procedure can 
be modified to retain tied alternatives unless they are beaten by something that 
comes later in o(n). In the present discussion, I shall be primarily concerned with 
results that do not depend on how ties are handled. A related problem with ties can 
arise in forming o(z) when the voting order depends on n, but I shall not dwell on 
this. 
In general, sequential majority elimination procedures are Condorcet. Moreover, 
if the order of voting is fixed, with G(x)=B(TI’) for all rr,rr’~rJ, then these 
procedures are monotonic for most reasonable ways of handling majority ties. For 
example, suppose ties are decided in favor of later alternatives in G(Z). If rc’ is 
obtained from rc by moving x up in several rankings of rc, then x does as well under 
rc’ as under rr against any other alternative, and comparisons between other 
alternatives do not change. Therefore, f(rr’) = {x} if f(n) = {x}. 
However, if a(n) changes, then a sequential majority elimination procedure may 
be nonmonotonic. For example, if 1x1 = 3 and the first alternative in a(n) is the one 
with the lowest point score for some score vector A ~/is, and if the second 
alternative in (T(X) is the majority loser between the other two, then the proof of 
Theorem 1 shows that the procedure violates monotonicity. On the other hand, if 
the order of voting is determined on the basis of the A scores for all three 
alternatives, without a runoff to determine second place in a(z), then monotonicity 
must hold so long as ties are not involved. 
Theorem 4. Given X= {x, y,z) and A EA 3, suppose u is determined by lowest to 
highest point totals under I for the sequential majority elimination procedure f. 
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Suppose further that n, n’~ IT, a(n) and a(~‘) are unambiguously determined by the 
A scores, and there are no majority ties under n or 71’. If f (n) = (x) and n’ is obtained 
from 7c by moving x up in several rankings of z, then f(rc’) = {x}. 
Proof. Suppose all the hypotheses hold. Then either x has a strict majority over 
each of y and z under rr, in which case the same is true for rr’, so f(n’) = {x), or there 
is a majority cycle, say xM(rr)yM(rr)~M(~)x, and the order of voting is either 
cr(rc) = yzu or o(rc) = zyx. As x moves up in rankings of n to yield n’, its A score does 
not decrease, and the A scores of y and z do not increase. Hence either a(n’) = yuc or 
a(n’)=zyx when M(n) cycles, and in either case f(n’)= {x} since yM(rc’)z and 
xM(7r’)y. 0 
As we shall prove shortly, the result of Theorem 4 does not hold when m 2 4 and 
a(n) is determined by low to high scores under a A ~/1,. In fact, we shall prove a 
stronger result for m = 4 (which generalizes easily to m>4) to the effect that a 
sequential majority elimination procedure must be nonmonotonic so long as a 
precedes b in o(rr) if bD(rc)a. 
The reader may have noticed that the methods we have mentioned for forming 
o(n) tend to place “weaker” alternatives early in the voting order. Hence, to win the 
election, a “weaker” alternative must win more pairwise majority contests than an 
alternative that appears later in the voting order. Beyond this, my main reason for 
putting “weaker” alternatives early in O(Z) has to do with Pareto optimality, which 
requires that if every voter ranks a ahead of b in n, then be f(n). It is well known 
that some sequential majority procedures are not Pareto optimal when mr4. The 
simplest example is rr = (xyzw, wxyz,zwxy) with o(n) = wxzy, where f(z) = { y} 
although all three voters prefer x to y. However, if o is determined (up to ties) by 
low to high scores for any strictly monotonic (A, > A,> ... > A,) score vector i e/1,, 
then f must be Pareto optimal. For, when such a 1 is used, and when every voter in 
rr ranks a ahead of b, then b must precede a in a(~), and if b survives until it faces a 
then it will be eliminated at that time. (If everyone prefers a to b, then the strong 
dominance relationship aD(n)b is not automatic although a weaker form of 
positional dominance [8, p. 5441 does hold.) 
Theorem 5. Suppose /X1 = 4 and f is a sequential majority elimination procedure 
for which a precedes b in a(n) whenever bD(rr)a. Then f is not monotonic. 
Proof. Let X= {x, y,z, w}, and consider the following 61-voter profiles II and rc’, 
where 7~’ is obtained from 7~ by moving x ahead of y in each of the three-voter 
rankings under n: 
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R II’ 71 71’ 
xyzw 12 15 xwyz 5 5 
yxzw 3 0 yxwz 4 4 
wxyz 7 10 yzwx 11 11 
wyxz 3 0 zwxy 10 10 
wzxy 2 5 wxzy 1 1 . 
wzyx 3 0 
In n,x has majorities over y and z, y has a majority over z, z has a majority over w, 
and w has majorities over x and y. Since the only changes from YC to 7~’ involve x and 
y, M(n’) =M(n). 
The position counts for the four alternatives under n are 
first second third fourth 
X 17 15 15 14 
Y 18 15 15 13 
Z 10 16 16 19 
W 16 15 15 15 
Therefore yD(n)xD(lc)wD(rr)z, so a(n) is zwxy. The noted majorities yield x as the 
majority elimination winner. Under n’, the position counts for z and w do not 
change, and the counts for x and y are (20,15,15,11) and (15,15,15,16), respectively. 
Therefore xD(rr’)wD(rr’)yD(rr’)z, so o(n’) is zywx. The majorities then give w as the 
winner. 0 
6. A nonelimination procedure 
Thus far in this paper, the election procedures that have been shown to violate 
monotonicity all involve some form of successive limination. We have seen that 
three very different types of elimination procedures are nonmonotonic. At the same 
time, some elimination procedures satisfy monotonicity: e.g., fi in Section 4, and 
sequential majority elimination with a fixed order of voting, from Section 5. 
However, the latter procedures violate Pareto optimality when m 24, and the 
natural extension of f2 to m 2 4 is neither Condorcet nor monotonic. 
In contrast to the plethora of elimination procedures that violate monotonicity, 
almost all reasonable-sounding election procedures that have been proposed in the 
literature and which do not involve determination of f(n) by successive limination 
are monotonic. In order not to give the impression that the latter procedures are all 
monotonic, we conclude by examining a Condorcet election procedure that is 
similar to what I have referred to elsewhere [9] as Dodgson’s function. The version 
of this function that is considered below is denoted as f3. 
Procedure f3 is based on the fewest inversions in a profile’s rankings that are 
needed to produce a Condorcet alternative. Given x E X and 71 E ZZ, we define Z(x, n) 
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as the fewest inversions in the rankings of 71 that are needed to yield a profile rr’ for 
which xM(rc’)y for each y E X \ (x}. As usual, an inversion in a ranking occurs each 
time that two adjacent alternatives are interchanged. Clearly, Z(x, z) = 0 if and only 
if xM(n)y for all y#x. We then define fJ by 
h(n)= (xEX: Z(x,rr)IZ(y,7r) for all VEX). 
An example on p. 478 of [9] shows that f3 is nonmonotonic when mr5. The 
following theorem covers m E { 3,4}. 
Theorem 6. f3 is monotonic when (XI =3 but not when (XI =4. 
Proof. We consider first the proof for m = 4 with X= {x, y,z, w} since this proof is 
instructive in seeing how monotonicity can fail for f3. Let n and n’ be the following 
43-voter profiles, where rc’ is obtained from n by moving x ahead of y in two of the 
five initial rankings of n: 
7c 7t’ 71 n’ 
yxzw 5 3 xzyw 5 5 
xyzw 0 2 xywz 9 9 
ywzx 9 9 wwy 15 15. 
The majority counts for rc are 
qx, y) = 29, is(x, w) = 34, 
??(y,z)=23, iz(y, w) = 28, 
ii(z, x) = 24, iz(z, w) = 25. 
Then, since three w to xz inversions in the final rankings give x a bare (22 to 21) 
majority over z, Z(x, 7~) = 3. Although only two yz to zy inversions are needed to get z 
over y, each of these entails a second inversion since every ranking of rc that has y 
ahead of z has a third alternative between y and z. Therefore Z(z, rr) = 4 and, since 
Z(y, rc) and Z(w, rc) clearly exceed 3, h(n) = {x}. 
After the two yx to xy inversions from n to rr’, two rankings of rr’ that have y 
ahead of z have y and z adjacent, and therefore Z(z, 75’) = 2. As before, Z(x, SC’) = 3, 
and it follows that f3(n’) = (z}. This completes the proof for IX/ = 4. 
Assume henceforth that X= {x, y,z} and suppose, contrary to the theorem, that 
fs is not monotonic in this case. Then, for definiteness, assume that TC’ is obtained 
from rr by moving x up, and that 
Z(x, 72) < min{Z(y, r&Z@, 701, 
Z(z, 71’) < Z(x, 71’) . 
This can only be true if 71 has no Condorcet alternative (strict majorities over the 
others). Moreover, since Z(x, TC’) I Z(x, TC), it follows that 1 I Z(z, rc’) < Z(x, 71’) I 
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Z(x, n) < Z(z, rr), hence that Z(z, n’) + 2 I Z(z, n) and 3 I Z(z, 7~). Since Z(z, n) 13, 
something else must have a strict majority over z in rr. Moreover, since 1 < Z(x, IL) < 
Z(y, rc), Z(y, rc) 2 3 and something else must have a strict majority over y in n. And x 
cannot do the job in both cases since otherwise it would be the Condorcet alternative 
for 7~. 
Therefore either ti(n)y and xM(n)z (hence yM*(n)x also), or yM(n)z and 
xM(rc)y (hence zM*(rc)x also). Now as x moves up in rc, it is easily seen that the 
number of xz to w inversions in order to get zhl(rc’)x cannot be fewer than the 
number needed to get z&Z(n)x. Hence it is impossible to have Z(z, IC’) < Z(z, rr) under 
the initial conditions given above when ti(rc)y and xM(rc)z. We therefore conclude 
that if these conditions hold, then yM(n)z,xM(7r)y and ti*(rr)x, where M* stands 
for majority win or tie. 
Given the latter majorities, and in view of the comment in the preceding para- 
graph on xz to zx inversions, the only way to get Z(z, n’) + 2 5 Z(z, n) is to force at 
least two yz to zy inversions to come from rankings yxz of II in going from yM(n)z 
to a profile that has z over y. But for this to be true, the number of yxz, rankings of 
IZ must exceed the total of all other rankings (i.e. xyz and yzx along with zyx,zxy and 
xzy), and since this would give y as the Condorcet alternative, we obtain a 
contradiction. 0 
Theorem 6 joins earlier results in sections 4 and 5 to show that various generic 
election procedures are monotonic when m = 3 but not when m 14. This suggests 
that there may be other reasonable-sounding procedures that only become non- 
monotonic when m > 4. Thus far I know of none. 
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